295,1
Every statement of natural necessity is conditional; one sought to do this, if one wants such and such. In rational morality, there can be no "ought" divorced from purpose. A standard presupposes a goal and has relevance only within the context of that goal. Likewise, the application of a standard and the subsequent 'ought" have no relevance outside the goal that made them possible.
295,2
As the basic method by which man achieves values, standards constitute the meta-ethical foundation of rational morality. It must be remembered that within the framework of a standard meta-ethics, one's goals are primary, and the standards must be derived accordingly; moral principles, in this view, are subservient to human purposes. One does not adopt a moral principle and cling to it through a complete change of context while losing sight of the goal with which it was originally associated.
295,3
In other words, it makes little sense to speak of "obeying" or "disobeying" a standard. One does not obey a standard; one adopts and follows it in a given context, for a given purpose. Whether or not one follows a specific standard depends upon the desirability of its goal and one's judgment of the standard's effectiveness in achieving that goal. One's motivation to follow a standard stems from the prior motivation to achieve a particular goal.15
This brief discussion is intended only to illustrate the motivational link between rational ethics and human action, and it should not be construed as a definitive presentation of this complex issue. Many important subjects cannot be pursued here, but the relevance of the foregoing remarks will become apparent upon considering the nature of religious ethics.
Every statement of natural necessity is conditional; one sought to do this, if one wants such and such. In rational morality, there can be no "ought" divorced from purpose. A standard presupposes a goal and has relevance only within the context of that goal. Likewise, the application of a standard and the subsequent 'ought" have no relevance outside the goal that made them possible.
295,2
As the basic method by which man achieves values, standards constitute the meta-ethical foundation of rational morality. It must be remembered that within the framework of a standard meta-ethics, one's goals are primary, and the standards must be derived accordingly; moral principles, in this view, are subservient to human purposes. One does not adopt a moral principle and cling to it through a complete change of context while losing sight of the goal with which it was originally associated.
295,3
In other words, it makes little sense to speak of "obeying" or "disobeying" a standard. One does not obey a standard; one adopts and follows it in a given context, for a given purpose. Whether or not one follows a specific standard depends upon the desirability of its goal and one's judgment of the standard's effectiveness in achieving that goal. One's motivation to follow a standard stems from the prior motivation to achieve a particular goal.15
This brief discussion is intended only to illustrate the motivational link between rational ethics and human action, and it should not be construed as a definitive presentation of this complex issue. Many important subjects cannot be pursued here, but the relevance of the foregoing remarks will become apparent upon considering the nature of religious ethics.
295,1
كلّ بيان من بيانات الضرورة الطبيعية تعتبر شرطية؛ وجب علي المرء أن يفعل هذا لاجل هذا ، في المبادىء الأخلاقية العقلانية، لا يمكن أن يكون هناك " يجب " منفصلة عن الغاية . المعيار يفترض الهدف وله صلة فقط ضمن سياق ذلك الهدف. على نفس النمط، تطبيق القياسي وما يلاحقة "يجب " ليس له صلة خارج الهدف الذي جعلهم ممكنا .
295,2
كالطريقة الأساسية التي فيها ينجز الرجل القيم، تشكّل المعايير أساس ما وراء الاخلاق للمبادىء الأخلاقية العقلانية. يجب أن يتذكّر بأنّ ضمن إطار معيار ما وراء الاخلاق، تعتبر اهداف الفرد اساسيه، والمعايير يجب أن تشتقّ وفقا لذلك؛ المبادئ أالأخلاقية، في وجهة نظر هذه ، متذلّل إلى الأغراض الإنسانية. لا يتبني المرء مبدأ أخلاقي ويتعلّق به خلال التغيير الكامل للسياق بينما يتغاضى عن الهدف الذي كان له علاقة أصلا.
295,3
بكلمة أخرى، ليس له معني الا القليل للتحدث عن معيار "الطاعة" أو "العصيان" . لا يطيع المرء معيار؛ واحد يتبنّى ويتبعه في سياق معطى، لغرض معطى. سواء أو لا يتابع المرء معيار معيّن يعتمد على رغبة هدفه وحكمته لفعالية المعيار في إنجاز ذلك الهدف. حافزه لإتّباع المعيار تنيع من الحافز المسبّق لنيل هدف معين. 15
هذه المناقشة القصيرة مقصودة فقط لتصوير الوصلة الحافزة بين الأخلاقيات العقلانية والعمل الإنساني، و لا يجب أن يكون تفسيرا كتقديم جازما لهذه القضية المعقّدة. العديد من المواضيع المهمة لا يمكن أن تتابع هنا، لكن صلة الملاحظات السابقة ستصبح ظاهرة عند إعتبار طبيعة الأخلاق الدينية.
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